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The Use of Judgmental Data in Roll Call Analysis
Despite the fact that the roll call voting patterns of legislators are being
used more frequently in the political arena, the statistical methods employed
by political scientists for analyzing roll calls (e.g. , Guttman scaling,
factor analysis) are not being used. The main reason is the failure to incor-
porate in a systematic manner the subjective estimates of the political
organizations and individuals who must use the output of such analyses.
This paper presents two methods, paired comparison and constant sum, which
use judgmental data in assessing roll calls. Using a set of seven defense
policy roll calls from the 19 76 US Senate, the methods are described and
compared using two sets of judges.

THE USE OF TUDGMENTAL DATA IN ROLL CALL ANALYSIS
Introduction
The political science discipline is undergoing an obvious change in
he direction of policy relevance. Conferences and panels increasingly focus
>n the utility of much of what we do for public policymakers . New journals
;xplicitly focusing on public policy have emerged. Textbooks on American
fovernment now must have "public policy" somewhere in the title. Government
unding for research is increasingly contingent on the political scientist demon-
strating the payoff of the proposed research for policymaking.
One area in political science where this does not appear to be the case
s legislative roll call analysis. It is the purpose of this article: 1) to first
show that the use of roll calls in politics is increasing; 2) to demonstrate why
most of the research in roll call analysis has not been utilized i'or policymaking;
3) and put forth several methods for using judgmental data in assessing roll calls
which will make this type of analysis more useful in the policy arena.
Increased Importance of Voting In The Political Arena
The use of roll calls to describe the performance of Congressmen in
general and on specific issues is not new. For example, the American Federation
Df Government Employees has rated Congressmen since the 1940s, and the
\mericans for Democratic Action since 1948. But it wasn't until the early 19 70s
that the "rating game" swung into high gear and became an important factor in
election campaigns . The key was the shift from the general orientation approach
(ADA, Congressional Quarterly's Conservative Coalition, etc.) to one focused
on specific issues.
No better example could be given than the impact of the Environmental
Action's Dirty Dozen campaign. In 1970, 1972, 1974 and 1976 this group used
roll call analysis to identify and publicize the twelve Congressmen with the
"worst" anti-environment record. Through 1974, 31 different Congressmen were
so identified. Seventeen were defeated in the first year being listed. Five
were defeated in subsequent elections. Two retired and seven remain in
Congress. In 1976, three of the "dirty dozen" were defeated.
This use of roll calls to pinpoint Congressmen who are performing
"poorly" or not in the best interests of certain groups is not limited to the liberal
causes such as consumerism and environment. For example, in November 1975
the Atlantic Richfield Company's Civic Action Program (CAP) compiled legislator
scores on the energy industry's position based on six key energy votes. The
clearly political intent is obvious since they listed only legislators "who rep-
2
resent a substantial number of CAP members. " They singled out Rep. Robert
W. Edgar (D-PA) for special attention, noting that his
votes since election can be characterized as being in opposition
to the search for and production of additional domestic energy
supplies . . . .As a freshman in a competitive political situation
and as a newcomer to the complexities of the energy industry,
he is a prime candidate for factual information. 3
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Perhaps the most bizarre example of the use of roll calls In the 1976
lection campaign was the ratings compiled by the National Alliance of Senior
Citizens (NASC) and the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC) . The NASC
i"Golden Age Index" rates Congressmen based on votes "perceived most demon-
strative of a commitment to fiscal responsibility. Republicans scored exceed-
.ngly high in this index. The NCSC index, on the other hand, is concerned more
with governmental programs in support of the elderly, such as pension reform
and Medicare benefits. Not surprisingly, high scores on this index rarely
coincide with high scores on the NASC index. In one heated California debate
between two candidates, a liberal incumbent was accused of "not caring about
the elderly" based on his NASC (fiscal responsibility) score. Although he was
quick to point out his high score on the NCSC index and secure an apology from
his opponent, the incident points out not only the increased use of roll call
analysis in politics but also the problems which occur when poorly constructed,
invalid and .misleading indices are essentially misused.
What is required is some sort of quality control of the "rating game. "
A good example of suggested control is a May 19 76 study entitled The Rating Game
,
published by the House Republican Research Committee. This report recommends
a "code of ethics , " several parts of which are relevant to the problems of roll
call analysis addressed in this article. Their code includes
an objective, rational and understandable vote selection
process, a guarantee of membership input in the determina-
tion of the rating group's concerns, detailed vote descrip-
tions, avoidance of percentage compilations, and tech-
nical accuracy in description and tabulations . 5
-3-
Political scientists may legitimately ask to what extent the scholarly work on
roll call analysis has addressed and perhaps alleviated the problems cited.
It is to such an inquiry that we now turn, examining briefly what has been
done and its applicability to the policymaking arena.
Roll Call Analysis in Political Science
No attempt will be made to duplicate the several textbooks and articles
which adequately survey the field of roll call analysis. However, a brief sum-
mary of some of the more commonly used methods will shed some light on the
general problem of using this type of analysis for policymaking.
By far the most frequently used method of using roll calls to describe
and explain legislative behavior is the simple percentage technique. Specifi-
cally, the various Congressional Quarterly indices are the data used in many of
the major studies of legislative behavior. This method assumes that each roll
call is equally weighted and is an attractive technique since the simple percen-
tage is a ratio measure which facilitates comparison across legislators and time,
and can be used in a variety of statistical techniques.
gAnother popular method is Guttman scaling, especially since the advent
of statistical computer packages which facilitate construction of the scales . It
has an advantage over simple percentage scales in that it empirically checks for
unidimensionality of the roll calls selected. A drawback of this method is that
it produces only an ordinal scale. This has not stopped many a political scien-
tist from assuming interval data and proceeding to invalidly use such scales in
q
regression analysis . J
4-
One of the disadvantages of the Guttman scaling approach is the lim-
ited number of roll calls which can be used to construct a scale (SPSS limits
the analyst to 12). Factor analysis is a third method of constructing scales
which alleviates this problem. As with the two previous methods, each roll
sail is equally weighted. The ability to process a greater number of roll calls
makes the selection and grouping of roll calls by issue-area somewhat more
objective than the Guttman technique, where some sort of subjective sorting
process must be used in order to get the number of roll calls to a workable size.
It should be added here that a significant amount of academic work has been
done comparing the statistical properties and structures of Guttman scale and
factor solutions. Warwick's evaluation of the two techniques concludes that
factor analysis is
a refinement over Guttman scaling in the assessment of roll
call similarity, although where this extra precision is not
required, Guttman scaling remains an acceptable methodology.
There have been several other methods of roll call analysis which have
been developed. Specifically, multi-dimensional scaling, cluster-bloc
14 15
analysis and smallest space analysis. Without judging their future
utility in describing or explaining legislative behavior, it can be said that
they have not been used to any great extent to this point. In addition, the three
methods previously summarized will serve to make the next point in this article,
namely that despite their statistical rigor, these methods fall short as techniques
which can be utilized in policymaking.
-5-
What are the shortcomings of these methods? First, and most crucial
to politics, is the selection of issues to make up the indices and scales. In
1976, there were 688 roll call votes in the Senate. If the policy problem is to
determine where a senator stands in regard to defense policy, which votes are
selected? To use Guttman scaling, a small subset of votes must be selected.
As Warwick points out, Guttman scaling is extremely sensitive to the vote
splits in each roll call. Out of 30 defense roll calls, 10 may scale, 10 may
not, simply based on the Yes-No breakdown on the vote. Factor analysis
improves the selection process somewhat, in that it can handle a larger number
of roll calls (although not the 688 roll calls in 1976). In my dissertation research
I found that factor analysis is more discriminating than Guttman scaling (e.g.
some military assistance roll calls appeared in the Guttman scales but formed
1
7
a distinct cluster when factored.) However, the problem which still remains
is insuring that, on any given roll call, a "Yes" is pro—or anti-defense. Was
the vote a procedural protest of some sort? Clearly, both Guttman and factor
analysis cannot address this problem.
A second problem with the three commonly used methods of roll-call
analysis is the assumption that each roll call adds equally to the dimension
being measured. Some votes are seminal, others on the same issue are trivial.
While these techniques can, over a large set of roll calls, give the general
orientation of a legislator, this is not adequate for policy purposes. This is
particularly noticeable in the defense issue-area. Senators Cranston and Tunney
would come out in any general evaluation as somewhat critical of the Defense
-6-
Department. Yet on the several roll calls to cut the B-l bomber, they were very
supportive of continuing the program.
There has been one recent attempt to solve this problem of determining
the relative importance of roll calls. Using the House of Representatives as
his source of data, Frans Bax has proposed an Index of Importance which
relies upon the practice of the House to allocate varying
amounts of time for debate on legislation coming to the
floor. . . .Bills receiving a rule are given a value on the
Index equal to the number of hours granted for a debate.
Bax then takes his index and finds that it correlates it with those attributes of
legislation that suggest importance—occurrence of a roll call vote on the bill,
frequency of roll call votes on the bill, partisan controversy, controversy within
committee, number of legislators voting, Presidential involvement, and floor
action in the form of amendments to the bill. Bax concludes that his "Index is
closely and explicitly linked to the judgments of those House members who are
20
expected to assess the relative importance of many bills .
"
Bax has overcome some of the obstacles to using roll calls in policy
analysis, particularly the problem of constructing unobtrusive measures of
importance. But his goal is similar to other approaches in that he is attempting
to create a picture of how the House "really" feels about the relative importance
of roll calls. His Index of Importance is an important step forward in under-
standing the House, but does not address the concern of this article. Namely,
how can we evaluate the interaction of the Congress with outside groups (interest
groups, executive agencies, etc.) using roll call analysis? What the House
deems important in defense policy (e.g. lengthy debate on the neutron bomb in
-7-
the summer of 1977) may not be as important to the Defense Department, or
specific groups within DoD such as the Navy.
The missing ingredient in all the approaches is the expert judgment which
must go into both the selection and weighting process. In terms of selection,
most organizations constructing voting indices do have a panel which selects
votes but rarely do they specify why the votes were selected, and why they
are a good indicator of the dimension being measured. This can only lead to
increased suspicion that votes are being selected to create a pattern for political
gain, a suspicion which leads to little use of the index. Although somewhat
general for most policy purposes, the ADA index has been used consistently
for many years as a credible index of a liberal voting record. As far as weighting
is concerned, little or none is conducted. I think the main reason for this is
that in their quest for objectivity, the raters feel that distinguishing the impor-
tance of roll calls is blatantly subjective, and hence don't even attempt it. The
major problem is that the search for objectivity is a futile one. A legislator
does not possess one "objective" attitude toward environmental, defense or
farm issues. Rather, there are various versions of this attitude which vary
according to the perceptions of the conflicting groups which determine policy in
accordance with what Allison has termed bureaucratic politics. If this is how
policy is made, and a legislator's voting record is to be used as a measure of
previous stances on issue-areas, it is obvious that attention must be paid to how
each group views the voting record. This means systematically tapping expert
8-
opinion regarding which votes make up an issue-area, and their relative weight
In contributing to the dimension being measured. It is to this task that we now
turn.
The Use of Judgment Data In Roll Call Analysis
Having concluded that expert opinion must be systematically measured
if roll call analysis is to be used in the political process, we now address spec-
ifically how this can be accomplished. The two basic steps involve the selection
of votes for a particular issue-area or dimension, and the weighting of those
votes in terms of their importance to the group making the index or scale. This
article is more concerned with the second step, so the first step of vote selection
will be only briefly mentioned. Obviously some sort of Delphi technique could
be used to arrive at a consensus as to what votes make up the dimension in
question. If such a selection is destined to be the rating organization's view,
care must be taken to insure that the judges selected to evaluate roll calls in
some way represent the organization and produce a true "party line. " How this
is done is much more a matter of organizational behavior and beyond the scope of
this article.
But once agreement is reached on what roll calls make up a certain
dimension, some sort of weighting procedure must be used so that a valid picture




The Method of Paired Comparisons
The basic idea in this method is that a judge can rank any two roll calls
as to their relative importance. If the scale being constructed contains n roll
calls, each judge will make n(n-l)/2 comparisons. The paired comparison
method converts these ordinal judgments into an interval scale. The method is
not new, having been in the methodological kits of psychologists since Thurstone
21
spelled out the Law of Comparative Judgement in 192 7. There have been many
22
applications of this method in political science but none which address roll
call voting. An example from the several experiments conducted during this
research will illustrate the method.
Seven Senate roll calls on defense policy were selected by the rating
organization (in this case, I selected them for experimental purposes) as indica-
tors of general attitude toward the Defense Department. The judges were given
a brief description and background on the vote, along with the recorded results
of the vote. They were instructed to assume the role of Secretary of Defense in
1976, and then rank the votes in terms of their importance to you as Secretary of
Defense. No ties were permitted. Two groups of judges were used. One was
my class in data analysis which had taken two courses, one in international
relations and another in American national security policy within the last six
months (hereafter referred to as Group NAVAL) . The other group was made up of
participants in the National Security Education Seminar held each summer at
Colorado College, a group with considerably more expertise and knowledge in
national security affairs (referred to as Group NSES).
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They were given a sheet of paper in the following format:
Most Important
Least Important
This raw data was then transformed into a matrix as shown in Table 1.
The data can be interpreted as follows. There were 4 out of 6 judges who felt
yote #12 was more important than #6, while only 1 judge thought #9 was more
.mportant than #6
.
These raw frequency rankings are next transformed into an array of pro-
portions , in which each cell entry (Pj^) is equal to the proportion of times roll
call k was judged more important than roll call j. (See Table 2)
The next step involves transforming these proportions into Z scores
using the table of normal distribution. The cell entries (Zj^) now equate to the
unit normal deviate corresponding to the proportions in Table 2. (See Table 3)
The final step in the process is the computation of a scale score for
each roll call, and is also included in Table 3 above. As can be seen, the
scale score for each roll call is the mean of each column. While the reader is
referred to Torgerson ^ for the theory and assumptions implicit in the technique,
11-
Table 1
Raw Data Matrix For Paired Comparison Technique
Roll Call # (k)





- 1 1 4 1 2 1
5 - 3 4 1 3 4
5 3 - 4 1 4 2
2 2 2 - 2 2 2
5 5 5 4 - 4 4
4 3 2 4 2 - 3
5 2 4 4 2 3 -
-12-
Table 2
Proportion Matrix For Paired Comparison Technique
Roll Call (k)









.20 .2 .667 .2 .333 .2
.833 - .5 .667 .2 .5 .667
.833 .5 - .667 .2 .667 .333
.333 .333 .333 - .333 .333 .333
.833 .833 .833 .667 - .667 .667
.667 .5 .333 .667 .333 - .5















12 13 15 16
-
-.841 -.841 .43 -.841 -.43 -.841
.965 - .43 -.841 .43
.965 - .43 -.841 .43 -.43
-.43 -.43 -.43 - -.43 -.43 -.43
.965 .965 .965 .43 - .43 .43
.43 -.43 .43 -.43 -
.965 -.43 .43 .43 -.43 -
.5514 -.1051 -.0437 .3685 -.5447' -.1201
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we can and should look at what has been done here. The best way to do this
is look at the highest and lowest scores . The roll call with the highest score
is #6. It received that score due to the basic fact that in most cases the judges
ranked it above all others. Roll call #13 received the lowest score because in
most cases it ranked below the other roll calls. Roll call #15 is in the middle of
the scale since overall the judges were ambivalent concerning its importance.
The resulting interval scale can be transformed to make it more inter-
retable. In this case, .5447 was added to each scale score resulting in the
following scale of importance for the 7 defense policy roll calls. (See Table 4)
Since these now are interval data, some basic conclusions can be
make relative to the importance of the roll calls . Mainly, there appears to be
three levels of importance--6 and 12, 15, 9, 7, and 16, and 13. The problem is
that very little else can be done with the scale. The purpose behind weighting
the votes was to apply them to individual legislators so that a "defense" score
could be produced. Since these are interval and not ratio data (i.e. , the
point is not meaningful since it does not indicate an absence of the dimension),
one cannot modify (multiply) a 'Yes ' vote by the weight of the roll call. An
illustration makes the point. Listed in Table 5 are the results of our experiment
so far. Scale A is the original scale, scale B has added +1 to each value. The




Defense Support Scale, Paired Comparison Technique
Roll Call Scale
# Subject of Roll Call Score
6 Cut off funds for B-l 1.0961
12 Conference Report - Defense Procurement .9132
15 Cut funds for Lance missile .5447
9 Cut off funds for Minuteman - Auth .501
7 Delay B-l decision until Feb 77 .4396
16 Cut off funds for nuclear carrier .4246
13 Defer decision on Minuteman .00
Table 5


















(+) = pro-defense vote
6 12 15 9 7 16 13 Score A Score B
Cong. X+ + - + + - + 2.9499 7.9499
Cong. Y++----+ 2.0093 5.0093
Cong. Z---- + -- .4396 1.4396
To see what has happened here, we compare the intervals between
Congressmen X and Y, and Y and Z, for both scales A and B. They should be






(2.0093-.4396) (5 . 0093-1. 4396) ' 1 . 5697 3.5697'
While the paired comparison method can shed some light on the relative
importance of roll calls to a group of judges
,
the resulting interval scale cannot
be used for the ultimate purpose of rating legislators on a specific dimension.
The Constant Sum Method
The key to the solution of the above problem is to obtain ratio data from
those judging the roll calls. Several alternatives exist. The first is to tell the
judges to give each roll call a value from to 1.0 such that the final results
reflect the ratios among roll calls. If one roll call is .4 and another .8, the
°4
latter contains twice as much of the property (e.g. anti-defense) as the former.^
Experience with this technique has shown that it is very difficult for judges to
think in ratio terms, especially with more than a few cases to evaluate. ° This
7 fi
has led to the so-called "pie allocation" approach, in which judges are given
a pie of 100 points, and asked to split it up so that each piece not only has a
size relative to all others, but the graphic aspect of the technique gives more
assurance that the judges are thinking in ratio terms.
-17-
There exists a third alternative, however, which also produces ratio
data but puts much less of a demand on the judge. This method is generally
termed direct estimation of sense ratios, or more specifically, the constant sum
27
method. As with the paired comparison technique, it is not a new method.
The stimuli (in our case the descriptions of the roll calls) are presented to the
judges in pairs . The judge is instructed to divide 100 points between them in
accordance with the absolute ratio of the greater to the lesser. Although the
judge still must think in ratio terms (assigning 80 points to one roll call and 2
to the other indicates the former is 4 times as "important" as the latter), his task
is simplified since he only must deal with one ratio at a time. Since the judge
does have the opportunity to assign points to a roll call, a natural point in
fact exists
.
How these raw data are converted into scale scores can best be describee
by returning to the previous set of roll calls and judges. Having simply ranked
the roll calls in importance, the judges were then given the roll calls in pairs
and asked to split 100 points between them. They were told that an 80-2 split
between a B-l issue and a nuclear carrier issue would indicate that the B-l roll
call is 4 times as critical to DoD as the nuclear carrier roll call in determining
whether a senator is '"pro" or "anti" defense.
The first matrix produced (Table 6) is a matrix V in which each cell (V-jJ




Matrix V With Elements Denoting The Average Number Of
Points Assigned To Roll Call k When Compared To Roll Call j
Roll Call k







50.0 24.3 27.9 55.7 19.3 32.2 50.0
75.7 50.0 52.9 74.7 41.2 51.4 50.3
72.1 47.1 50.0 75.0 22.9 50.0 50.8
44.3 25.3 25.0 50.0 19.3 27.1 29.3
80.7 58.9 67.1 80.7 50.0 59.3 67.1
67.9 48.6 50.0 72.9 40.7 50.0 40.0
50.0 49.7 49.3 70.7 32.9 60.0 50.0
-19-
The next step is to construct a matrix W in which each cell is the ratio
of the average points indicated by the column to those indicated by the row (Table
7). (wjk=Yin)
vkj
The final step involves calculating the geometric means of the columns
? 8
of the above matrix. The scale values for each roll call (SJ are calculated
using the following equation:
n
log Sk =^T lo<3 wjk
Jzl
n
where n = the number of roll calls
.
The actual scale values are the antilogs of the above values , calculated
as follows:
Sk =





= [(1)(3.118)(2.589(.794)(4.184)(2.110)(1)] 1//7 = 1.78
Us'ing the above approach, two sets of scales were constructed; one
using the experts from the National Security Education Seminar (NSES) and the
other using naval officers from my data analysis class (NAVAL). The following
table gives the results of these two experiments. (See Table 8)
In a quick test of the rank orders of the four scales , a non-parametric
test (Kendall's tau) was conducted to determine the level of association of the
four scales. (See Table 9)
-20-
Table 7
Matrix W With Elements Denoting The Ratio Of Average Points
Indicated By The Column To Those Indicated By The Row
Roll Call k








1 .321 .386 1.259 .239 .474 1.00
3.118 1 1.12 2.958 .699 1.059 1.012
2.589 .892 1 .667 .340 1.00 1.028
.794 .338 .333 1 .239 .373 .414
4.184 1.430 2.937 4.181 1 1.457 2.044
2.110 .944 1.00 2.683 .686 1 .667
1.00 .988 .972 2 . 414 .489 1.5 1
-21-
Table 8 - Defense Support Scales, Constant Sum Method
Roll Call
S12 - Conference Report - Defense Procurement
56 - Cut off Funds for B-l
Sig - Cut off Funds for Nuclear Carrier
Sg - Cut off Funds for Minuteman - Auth
S,r - Cut off Funds for Lance Missile
57 - Dalay B-l Decision Unitl February 77











Rank Order Correlation of Guttman,

















The two constant sum scales were highly related, whereas the other
elationships were much lower. We have now produced ratio data which not only
iifferentiates each roll call in terms of its importance, but also in a form that
:an be used in assigning scores (in this case "anti-defense" scores) to indi-
/idual legislators. Some examples using 1976 votes will demonstrate the use of
the various techniques . (See Tables 10 and 11)
In each of the tables, the "Guttman" score is a simple index of the
number of anti-defense votes (common practice in most Guttman scale analyses)
.
In Table 10, the scale scores for the "pure" types of senators are listed. The
first conclusion drawn is that using tha rank-order scores produced by the Guttman
procedure as interval data would be seriously misleading. Second, there are some
significant differences when Senator Burdick is rated by the two groups of
experts (NSES vs NAVAL) . If NAVAL represents either an interest group or gov-
ernmental bureaucracy which keys their activity to anti-defense activity, they
will perhaps be watching Burdick more closely than NSES.
* The key conclusions, however, are drawn from Table 11, in which the
scores of "mixed" types are listed. It should simply, but significantly, be noted
that senators with identical Guttman scores have different NSES and NAVAL scores,
and conversely, similar NSES and NAVAL scores produce dissimilar Guttman scores,
In the case of mythical Senator C the lower Guttman score produces a higher
NSES and NAVAL score. Clearly, the unidimensionality test implicit in Guttman
scaling is inadequate in accurately depicting the magnitude of the "anti-defense"












Constant Sum Scale Scores For Pure Type Senators
(+) - Anti-Defense Position on Roll Call
Roll Call Number























Constant Sum Scale Scores For Mixed Type Senators
Roll Call Number

















The methods put forth in this article are intended to spur discussion and
esearch regarding how roll call data can and should be employed in the policy-
laking arena. It has been assumed that the bureaucratic politics model accurately
ixplains policy outputs, that policy is a function of bargaining, power and influence
.egislators' votes are a record of their position, and as such form the "previous
stances" useful in the bargaining which constitutes politics. This is not to say
hat there are not serious normative questions concerning the permanent adoption
29
)f this model, or that the search for an objective measure using roll calls is
lot a desirable goal. Rather, what has been said here is that bureaucratic politics
.s descriptive of how policy is made, roll call analysis (however crude) is part
of the currency in such policymaking, and more attention should be paid to
designing methods which take into account the selection and weighting of roll
calJs by experts representative of the organizations involved.
-25-
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